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Abstract. We introduce a new game, the so-called bin coloring game,
in which selfish players control colored items and each player aims at
packing its item into a bin with as few different colors as possible.
We establish the existence of Nash and strong as well as weakly and
strictly Pareto optimal equilibria in these games in the cases of capaci-
tated and uncapacitated bins. For both kinds of games we determine the
prices of anarchy and stability concerning those four equilibrium con-
cepts. Furthermore, we show that extreme Nash equilibria, those with
minimal or maximal number of colors in a bin, can be found in time
polynomial in the number of items for the uncapcitated case.
Keywords: algorithmic game theory, bin coloring, Nash equilibria, strong
equilibria, weakly/ strictly Pareto optimal Nash equilibria, price of an-
archy, price of stability, extreme Nash equilibria
1 Introduction
In 1999, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [18, 19] laid the basis for a
new direction of research in theoretical computer science by intro-
ducing the coordination ratio, transferring the concept of approxi-
mation ratio, for NP-complete problems, and competitive ratio, for
online problems, to games. This coordination ratio is defined as the
quotient of the social cost of a worst Nash equilibrium and the op-
timal social cost and thus measures the loss in overall performance
due to the lack of central coordination in non-cooperative games,
where Nash equilibria are considered as the solution concept to these
games. This resembles the lack of knowledge of future events in on-
line scenarios and the lack of computation time and storage space
for NP-complete problems.
With this seminal work Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [18, 19]
combined classical game theory with concepts of theoretical com-
puter science resulting in the new field of algorithmic game theory.
The motivation behind this new approach is to understand the de-
velopment, structure and mode of operation of networks in which
users with various interests interact. Especially, the internet with its
tremendous impact on everyday life motivates to study systems with
selfish users in order to get an idea how to positively influence the
interactions of users in the world wide web.
The coordination ratio, as introduced in [18], is today mostly
referred to as price of anarchy (PoA) due to Papadimitriou [24]. It
is extensively studied for various problems starting from selfish job
scheduling in the KP-Model, named after Koutsoupias and Papadim-
itriou [18, 19], for Nash equilibria in pure as well as mixed strategies
(see among others [18, 19, 23, 10, 15, 14]).
Anshelevich et al. [2] add a more positive measure by taking
the best Nash equilibrium into consideration. The resulting price
of stability (PoS) indicates how much the performance of a system
suffers in order to get a solution acceptable to all users.
Andelman et al. [1] use strong equilibira, as introduced by Au-
mann [3], as a solution concept and establish the strong price of
anarchy (SPoA) as a measure of performance when coordination of
the users is possible. Strong equilibria are stable against the devi-
ation of coalitions (where each player in a coalition must improve
its cost) and not only deviations of single users as in Nash equilib-
ria. The authors state that in games where the SPoA is significantly
smaller than the PoA, coordination of users can improve the overall
performance of the system.
Chien and Sinclair [6] as well as Holzman and Law-Yone [17]
use the concept of Pareto optimality, which is well studied in eco-
nomics [22], to characterize certain Nash equilibria and the resulting
price of anarchy and stability. In a (weakly) Pareto optimal Nash
equilibrium there is no alternative strategy choice beneficial for all
players. A strictly Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium is also stable
against deviations in which some players do not benefit but are also
not worse off and at least one player improves his personal cost.
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A classical problem in combinatorial optimization is the bin pack-
ing problem in which items of different sizes are to be packed into as
few bins, with a given capacity, as possible. This problem is known
to be NP-hard (see Coffman and Csirik [7] for a general survey).
The analysis of bin packing in the algorithmic game theory con-
text is started by Bilo` [4]. In non-cooperative bin packing games,
each item is controlled by a player and the cost of the player is
proportional to the item’s share in the bin space used. Hence, each
player wants to minimize its cost by packing its item into the most
filled bin it fits in. The social cost is the number of bins used and
the goal is to keep this number as small as possible.
Bilo` [4] proves the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strate-
gies by showing that the greedy best response dynamics converge
in finite time. He also establishes that there is always a Nash equi-
librium with minimal number of bins, i.e., the price of stability is
1, but that finding such a good equilibrium is NP-hard. First upper
and lower bounds on the price of anarchy are also given by Bilo` [4].
Epstein and Kleiman [12] analyze the price of anarchy and stabil-
ity as well as the strong price of anarchy and stability. They improve
on the bounds of Bilo` [4] and give nearly tight bounds for the price
of anarchy. Additionally, the authors prove the existence of a strong
Nash equilibrium in every bin packing game and establish that the
strong price of anarchy and the strong price of stability are identical
and given by the approximation ratio of the Subset Sum algorithm, a
greedy algorithm for the classical bin packing problem. For years the
exact approximation ratio of this algorithm was unknown although
almost matching upper and lower bounds were given by Caprara and
Pferschy [5]. Finally, Epstein, Kleiman and Mestre [13] succeeded in
closing this gap.
Yu and Zhang [28] add that one pure equilibrium can be com-
puted in polynomial time by a recursive variant of the First-Fit De-
creasing algorithm for bin packing.
The classical bin packing problem is also studied in several vari-
ants: Csirik and Woeginger [9] give a survey on online bin packing
and Csirik and Leung [8] give an overview of (other) variants of the
bin packing problem.
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One of those variants are so-called class-constrained packing prob-
lems, in which the items are grouped into different classes identified
by colors. Each bin is equipped not only with a limited capacity
concerning the size of items to be packed into it, but also with an
upper bound on the number of different colors present in the bin.
The goal in the optimization problem is to minimize the number of
used bins. These problems were studied among others by Shachnai
and Tamir [25, 26] as well as Xavier and Miyazawa [27].
Class-constrained packing problems are closely related to the bin
coloring problem introduced by Krumke et al. [20] motivated by an
application in a distribution center for office supply. In the oﬄine
model, unit-sized items of different colors are to be packed in a fixed
order into bins, and at any time during the packing process, only
up to a fixed number of bins may be partially filled. The aim is
to pack as few different colors in a bin as possible. In the online
variant the items arrive one after the other and have to be packed
immediately and irrevocably, i.e., any algorithm has to pack the
items without knowledge of further items. The authors establish that
finding an optimal packing for the oﬄine case is already NP-hard in
a special case, where it is additionally known that the items exactly
fit into a certain number of bins. Additionally, Krumke et al. [20]
analyze the performance of different online algorithms and establish
the surprising result that packing exactly one bin at a time yields a
better competitive ratio than a natural greedy strategy.
Hiller and Vredeveld [16] use stochastic comparison for a proba-
bilistic analysis of online bin coloring algorithms and this yields more
intuitive results in the comparision of the two algorithms of Krumke
et al. [20]. See also [11] for a comparison of these algorithms which
yields more intuitive results as well.
Lin et al. [21] address other variants of bin coloring from the
point of view of competitive analysis. The authors motivate their
further study of this problem by an application in networks where
the items of one color represent the packets of a single task and the
bins correspond to channels. In the minimum bin coloring setting the
number of bins is fixed, the items fit exactly into this number of bins
and the aim is to minimize the maximal number of different colors in
the bin. The online maximum bin coloring aims at packing the items
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online in such a way that the minimal number of different colors in
the bins is maximized. Both problem variants aim at maximizing
two different measures of fairness among the users.
In this paper we analyze this minimum bin coloring problem (of
[21]) in the context of algorithmic game theory, i.e., when the items
of the bin coloring problem are controlled by selfish players.
Contribution
We address a new class of non-cooperative games, so-called bin color-
ing games. In these games, selfish colored unit-sized items are packed
into a fixed number of (uncapacitated or capacitated) bins. The items
aim at being packed in a bin with items of as few other colors as
possible. The social objective is to minimize the maximal number of
different colors in a bin.
We establish the existence of optimal Nash and strong as well
as weakly and stricly Pareto optimal Nash equilibria in capacitated
and uncapacitated bin coloring games.
The price of anarchy in uncapacitated bin coloring games varies
from unbounded for Nash equilibria in general over asymptotically 1
for strong and weakly Pareto optimal Nash equilibria to 1 for strictly
Pareto optimal Nash equilibria. For the capacitated case we add that
the price of anarchy is unbounded but given by the number of bins,
if only games with a constant number of bins are considered.
For uncapacitated bin coloring games, we also give a simple poly-
nomial algorithm to find a strong equilibrium and discuss best and
worst Nash equilibria of single instances.
Roadmap
In Section 2 we formally define bin coloring games and introduce
necessary notation. Nash equilibria in these games are addressed in
Section 3. First, we establish their existence, then analyze the price
of anarchy and stability, and add results on extreme Nash equilibria.
Section 4 is concerned with the existence of strong equilibria as well
as the strong price of anarchy and stability. Before we conclude the
work in Section 6, we derive implications of the previously estab-
lished results on weakly and strictly Pareto optimal Nash equilibria
in Section 5.
5
2 Preliminaries and Notation
In bin coloring games selfish players control items of equal sizes but
different colors. Each player controls a single item. The aim of the
players is to put their item in a bin with as few colors as possible.
The number of bins is limited and the load of the bins is either not
bounded in the uncapacitated case or bounded in the capacitated
one.
More formally an instance Γ =[m, k, (ni)i∈{1,...,k}, U ] of the bin
coloring game is given by the number m ∈ Z+ of bins, the num-
ber k ∈ Z+ of colors implying the set C := {1, . . . , k} of colors, the
numbers ni ∈ Z
+, i = 1, . . . , k of items of color i and the bin capac-
ity U ∈ Z+ ∪{∞}. Thus the number of items n in the game is given
by n =
∑k
i=1 ni. We refer to the set of all items by N and identify
every player with its item. The strategy set of each player equals the
set of bins.
Additionally, the sets of uncapacitated (U =∞) and capacitated
(U < ∞) bin coloring games are denoted by BC and BCcap, respec-
tively. In this paper, we always assume that every instance to the
capacitated bin coloring has a feasible solution. That is, mU ≤ n.
An outcome of a bin coloring game is given by a strategy pro-
file σ = (σ1, . . . , σn), i.e., an assignment of items to bins with σi ∈
{1, . . . ,m} for all i ∈ N . We denote by σ−i the strategy profile in
which all players keep their choice as in σ but the item of player i
is removed. Analogously, for a subset I ⊆ N we refer to a strategy
profile in which all players in I are ignored by σ−I .
The load of bin j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} is given by
ℓj(σ) = |{i ∈ {1, . . . , n}|σi = j}|
and equals the number of items in the bin. In contrast to that the
color load, i.e., the number of colors in the bin, is referred to by clj(σ).
More formally, let zi denote the color of item i, and let clj(σ) =
|{zi|σi = j}|. The personal cost ci(σ) of a player i with strategy σi
is determined by ci(σ) = clσi(σ).
The social cost of a strategy profile is given by the maximal
number of different colors in a bin:
sc(σ) = max
j=1,...,m
clj(σ) = max
i=1,...,n
ci(σ).
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The minimal social cost of a strategy profile in game Γ is referred
to as opt(Γ ).
One concept of stability is to consider a strategy profile as sta-
ble if no player wants to deviate from its chosen bin. This idea is
formalized by the concept of Nash equilibria.
Definition 1 (Nash equilibrium). A strategy profile σ is a (pure)
Nash equilibrium of the bin coloring game Γ =[m, k,(ni)i∈{1,...,k},U ] if
for all i ∈ N and strategy choice σ¯i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} s.t. ℓσ¯i(σ−i, σ¯i) ≤ U
ci(σ) = clσi(σ) ≤ clσ¯i(σ−i, σ¯i) = ci(σ−i, σ¯i)
In general, bin coloring games do not have a unique Nash equi-
librium and we denote the set of Nash equilibria of an instance Γ of
the bin coloring game by NE(Γ ).
Example 1. Consider the following instance of the uncapacitated bin
coloring game (U = ∞), 3 bins and 6 items, where there are two
items of each one of the colors: red, blue and yellow. Two packings of
these items are given in Figure 1. Both packings shown in Figures 1a
b b r
r y y
(a) A non-optimal coloring, which is
a Nash equilibrium
b r y
b r y
(b) An optimal coloring (which
is a Nash equilibrium)
Fig. 1: Comparison of different colorings
and 1b are Nash equilibria. However, the packing in Figure 1a has
social cost 2, while the one in Figure 1b has optimal social cost 1.
Observe that if the players can cooperate, then the packing in
Figure 1a is not stable, as all players are better off in the packing in
Figure 1b and thus would have an incentive to jointly deviate.
The latter observation leads to the notion of strong equilibria as
introduced by Aumann [3].
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Definition 2 (Strong equilibrium). A strategy profile σ is a strong
equilibrium if for every coalition I ⊆ N and any strategy choice σ¯I
of players in I with ℓj(σ−I , σ¯I) ≤ U , j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, there is a
member i ∈ I with
ci(σ−I , σ¯I) ≥ ci(σ).
The definition states that for every coalition and every feasible
strategy choice, at least one member of the coalition is not better off.
An equivalent statement is that for no coalition there is a feasible
strategy choice beneficial to all its members.
Note also that the set SE(Γ ) of strong equilibria of the bin col-
oring game Γ is a subset of NE(Γ ) as coalitions of size 1 can not
improve by changing their strategy.
There are also intermediate concepts between Nash and strong
equilibria, so-called weakly Pareto optimal Nash equilibria:
Definition 3 (Weakly/Strictly Pareto optimal Nash equilib-
rium). A Nash equilibrium σ is weakly Pareto optimal if there is no
strategy choice σ¯ s.t. for all i ∈ N
ci(σ¯) < ci(σ).
A Nash equilibrium σ is strictly Pareto optimal if there is no
strategy profile σ¯ and i∗ ∈ N s.t. for all i ∈ N \ {i∗}
ci(σ¯) ≤ ci(σ) and ci∗(σ¯) < ci∗(σ).
We denote by wPNE(Γ ), sPNE(Γ ) the set of weakly and strictly
Pareto optimal Nash equilibria of the bin coloring game Γ , respec-
tively.
In weakly Pareto optimal Nash equilibria the grand coalition of
all players cannot deviate in such a way that all players are better
off. In comparison to strong equilibria coalitions of more than one
player but less than all players are not considered. So every strong
equilibrium is also weakly Pareto optimal.
Strictly Pareto optimal Nash equilibria take into account that
players might participate in a coalition without improving their per-
sonal cost, if they are not worse off and can help other players, such
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as i∗, to improve their cost. In general neither Nash nor strong equi-
libria are strictly Pareto optimal.
Another approach for classifying specific Nash equilibria and es-
pecially for addressing Nash equilibria with different social cost in
one instance, as given in Example 1, is to ask for extreme representa-
tives of the set of Nash equilibria and this gives rise to the following
two problems:
Definition 4 (Extreme Nash Equilibrium Problems). Find-
ing Nash equilibria with best or worst social cost corresponds to solv-
ing two optimization problems:
Best Nash Equilibrium Problem (BNE)
Given: Instance Γ =[m, k, (ni)i∈{1,...,k},∞] of the uncapacitated
Bin Coloring Game.
Output: A Nash equilibrium σ, with a minimum social cost.
Worst Nash Equilibrium Problem (WNE)
Given: Instance Γ =[m, k, (ni)i∈{1,...,k},∞] of the uncapacitated
Bin Coloring Game.
Output: A Nash equilibrium σ, with a maximum social cost.
Instead of focusing on a single instance, also the whole set of
(un)capacitated bin coloring games can be characterized by deter-
mining the worst-case ratio of the optimal social cost and that of
a best or worst Nash equilibrium. Thus we consider the following
metrics.
Definition 5 (Price of Anarchy and Stability). For G ∈ {BC,BCcap}
the price of anarchy PoA(G) is given by
PoA(G) = sup
Γ∈G
sup
σ∈NE(Γ )
sc(σ)
opt(Γ )
.
If instead the best Nash equilibrium of every instance is considered
this leads to the price of stability
PoS(G) = sup
Γ∈G
inf
σ∈NE(Γ )
sc(σ)
opt(Γ )
.
This concept is applied analogously to strong equilibria as well
as weakly/strictly Pareto optimal Nash equilibria yielding the strong
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price of anarchy SPoA(G) and the strong price of stability SPoS(G)
as well as the Pareto prices of anarchy wPPoA(G), sPPoA(G) and
stability wPPoS(G), sPPoS(G).
So far we have identified the players decisions directly using the
strategy profile. Due to the structure of bin coloring games it suffices
to represent the strategy choices of the players by an assignment A =
(aij) of colors i = 1, . . . , k to bins j = 1, . . . ,m, where aij is the
number of items of color i packed into bin j.
Fortunately, this compact representation suffices to describe Nash
equilibria as well as strong ones due to the fact, that knowing the
assignment allows to calculate the load ℓj(A) =
∑k
i=1 aij as well
as the number of colors clj(A) = |{i ∈ {1, . . . , k}|aij > 0}| of any
bin j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and thus to evaluate the social cost.
As long as uncapacitated bin coloring games are considered, the
number of items of one color can be neglected as well, as the load
of the bin does not matter in that scenario. If an item with color i
has an incentive to change from bin j1 to bin j2 so have all items of
color i in bin j1 and due to the unboundedness of the bins such a
change is also possible.
We note that even if a Nash equilibrium is represented as an
assignment of colors to bins (not items to bins), this information is
not always polynomial in the input size of the game as we need a
size which is Θ(mk) information to store this assignment (which is
not polynomial in log(m), k, and log n). If the number k of colors is
greater than m, then O(mk) ⊆ O(k2) and the information is input-
polynomial.
3 Nash Equilibria in Bin Coloring Games
In this section we address existence and computability of Nash equi-
libria as well as the performance of Nash equilibria in comparison to
the optimal assignment.
First, in the uncapacitated case the optimal assignment of items
to bins can be easily calculated:
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Lemma 1. An optimal assignment A of an uncapacitated bin col-
oring game Γ =[m, k, (ni)i∈{1,...,k}, ∞] has sc(A) = ⌈k/m⌉.
Proof. Packing all items of one color at once to the bin with least
colors so far yields an assignment with the above maximum number
of colors in a bin. As each color has to be assigned to at least one
bin, this solution is optimal. ⊓⊔
Additionally, the assignment in the proof of Lemma 1 is also a
Nash equilibrium, which establishes the following corollary:
Corollary 1. Every uncapacitated bin coloring game Γ =[m, k,
(ni)i∈{1,...,k}, ∞] admits at least one optimal Nash equilibrium.
Price of Anarchy and Stability
Corollary 1 implies not only existence of a Nash equilibrium in every
instance but also that PoS(BC) = 1. In addition, the price of anarchy
is determined as follows:
Theorem 1. The price of anarchy of uncapacitated bin coloring
games with m bins equals the number of bins: PoA(BCm) = m.
Proof. Recalling Lemma 1, the upper bound is easy, as any assign-
ment can not have more than all k different colors in one bin. For
the lower bound consider the following example: We construct an
instance with k = m colors and ni = m items of each color i ∈
{1, . . . , k}. Assigning all items of one color to one bin obviously yields
an optimal solution with only one color in every bin. But packing
one item of every color into every bin yields a Nash equilibrium with
m colors in every bin. ⊓⊔
For the whole class of uncapacitated bin coloring games, we con-
clude:
Corollary 2. The price of anarchy PoA(BC) of uncapacitated bin
coloring games is unbounded.
Note that this lower bound of m on the price of anarchy holds
also for the capacitated case as we can always consider the capaci-
tated case with U = n, that is equivalent to the uncapacitated case.
In addition, for any capacitated bin coloring game Γ the relation
opt(Γ ) ≥ ⌈ k
m
⌉ holds as well. Hence, we conclude the following:
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Corollary 3. The price of anarchy PoA(BCcap) of capacitated bin
coloring games is unbounded but equals to the number of bins for
games BCcap,m with a fixed number m of bins.
Computing Extreme Nash Equilibria
We have already seen that a best Nash equilibrium in the uncapaci-
tated case can be calculated in time O(k) using the construction in
the proof of Lemma 1 and thus BNE can be solved in linear time.
The situation is more involved for the worst Nash equilibrium:
Our algorithm to solve WNE is based on the following structural
lemma which characterizes how the number of colors of the bins can
vary in a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 2. Let A be a Nash equilibrium of Γ =[m, k, (ni)i∈{1,...,k},
∞] with the social cost sc(A) = r + 1 for some value of r. Then,
there is a p ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that the set of bins is partitioned
into two sets M1, M2 with |M1| = p, clj(A) = r + 1 for all j ∈ M1,
and clj(A) = r for all j ∈M2.
Moreover, in A there is no color with items in bins in M1 as well
as in M2, i.e., the set of colors is partitioned as well.
Proof. Let M1 denote the set of bins which contain items of r + 1
colors (by definition, M1 6= ∅), and let M2 be the (possibly empty)
set of bins which contain r colors.
If there is a bin j with clj(A) ≤ r − 1, then any item in a bin
j1 ∈ M1 with clj1(A) = r + 1 has an incentive to deviate from bin
j1 to j. This deviation can increase the number of colors in j to at
most r colors. Hence, M1 ∪M2 is a partition of {1, . . . ,m}.
It remains to show that there are no two items with color i which
are packed into bins j1 ∈ M1 and j2 ∈ M2, respectively. Assume for
the sake of a contradiction that such a color i and bins j1 ∈ M1,
j2 ∈ M2 exist. Then the item with color i in j1 has an incentive to
deviate and move to bin j2 as r + 1 = clj1(A) > clj2(A) = r and
this deviation does not increase the number of colors in j2. Thus,
the claim follows. ⊓⊔
Motivated by Lemma 2, consider packings with the following
properties: κ is the total number of colors, such that there are ηi
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items of color i which are packed into τi ≤ min{π, ηi} bins. More-
over, all bins are packed with items of either α or α+1 colors, where
0 ≤ β ≤ π − 1 is the number of bins with α + 1 colors. In order to
allow the existence of such a packing, the condition
κ∑
i=1
τi = απ + β
must be satisfied. We let τ = (τ1, τ2, . . . , τκ) and η = (η1, η2, . . . , ηκ).
Such a packing is called a (π, κ, α, β, τ , η) packing.
To introduce a solution algorithm for WNE we start by defining
a round-robin packing for π bins: Let j =
(
i−1∑
l=1
τl mod π
)
+ 1. The
items of color i are assigned to bins starting from bin j, where bin j
receives ηi−τi+1 items, and each successive bin receives one item. If
at some stage bin π is reached, the next items, if existing, are packed
into bins 1, 2, . . ..
Lemma 3. For any (π, κ, α, β, τ , η) packing, this round-robin pack-
ing is an alternative (π, κ, α, β, τ , η) packing.
Proof. To show the claim, it suffices to consider the number of colors
in each bin. Since τi ≤ π for all 1 ≤ i ≤ κ, the process above defines
a packing where the total number of colors in all bins is
κ∑
i=1
τi. Since
a round-robin packing method is used, and
κ∑
i=1
τi = απ + β, the β
first bins have a load of α + 1, while the other bins have a load of
α. ⊓⊔
Therefore, we restrict our further analysis to round-robin packings.
Our Algorithm SolveWNE is based on the above Lemmata 2
and 3. It uses dynamic programming to create the partition of the
colors into two sets C1 and C2, where items with colors in C1 are
packed into bins from M1 := {1, . . . , p} and those with colors from
C2 into bins in M2 := {p+1, . . . ,m}. Additionally, each bin j1 ∈M1
will have r+1 colors and each bin j2 ∈M2 only r ones, respectively.
Note that a packing with these properties is always a Nash equilib-
rium, as no item has an incentive to change to another bin. Since we
do not know p in advance, we will apply procedure SolveWNEp for
all values of p ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Taking Lemma 2 into account, we get a simple upper bound
for the maximum number of colors in a bin in a Nash equilibrium
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rmax := ⌈
∑
k
i=1 min{ni,m}
m
⌉. In general, this is not better than just k,
but if there are only few items of the same color, then this bound is
stronger.
The general idea of the dynamic programming SolveWNEp is to
test for a fixed value p ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and for all a, c ∈ {0, 1, . . . , rmax},
b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}, d ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m − p − 1} and i ∈ {1, . . . , k},
whether there is a partition of the first i colors in such a way, that
the first p bins have a or a + 1 colors and exactly b of them have
a+ 1 colors and the bins of the second group have c or c+ 1 colors
and exactly d bins have c+ 1 colors, i.e., determine the values
fp(a, b, c, d, i) :=
{
1 if such a partition exists
0 else
as follows:
1. For i = 0 and for all a, c ∈ {0, 1, . . . , rmax}, b ∈ {0, 1, . . . , p − 1}
and d ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,m− p− 1} set:
fp(a, b, c, d, 0) =
{
1 if a = 0, b = 0, c = 0 and d = 0
0 otherwise .
2. The (i+ 1)-th color is assigned in a round-robin manner, i.e.,
fp(a, b, c, d, i+ 1) =

1 if fp(a, b− ti+1, c, d, i) = 1
for some 1 ≤ ti+1 ≤ min{ni+1, b− 1}
or fp(a− 1, p+ b− ti+1, c, d, i) = 1
for some b ≤ ti+1 ≤ min{ni+1, p}
or fp(a, b, c, d− ti+1, i) = 1
for some 1 ≤ ti+1 ≤ min{ni+1, d− 1}
or fp(a, b, c− 1,m− p+ d− ti+1, i) = 1
for some d ≤ ti+1 ≤ min{ni+1,m− p}
0 else
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
In this recursion, the value of ti+1 (1 ≤ ti+1 ≤ ni+1) is the number
of bins in which items with color i+1 are packed in the underlying
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round robin assignment. If the items of color i + 1 are added to
the first set of bins, then ti+1 ≤ p as well, and ti+1 ≤ m − p
otherwise.
In the first case, there are two subcases: Either these items are
used to fill bins that had only a colors such that the number b of
bins with a + 1 colors increases, this case occurs if ti+1 ≤ b − 1,
and is described in (1), or the items packed increase a, hence all
bins with only a− 1 colors are filled to a colors and additional b
bins were filled to a+1, in this case ti+1 ≥ b, and this is described
in (2). (3) and (4) describe the analogous cases where color i+ 1
is assigned to the second set of bins.
If p = m and thus there is no real partition of the bins, we simply
have to analyze fm(a, b, i) and the recursion only contains the first
two cases.
Algorithm SolveWNE applies SolveWNEp for all p ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
and afterwards finds the maximum value of r + 1 such that there is
a value of p ∈ {1, . . . ,m − 1}, for which fp(r + 1, 0, r, 0, k) = 1 or
fm(r + 1, 0, k) = 1.
Note that in order to construct a strategy profile, it is necessary
to backtrack the values ti, and the assignment of colors into the two
sets.
We now analyze Algorithm SolveWNE and show, that if it does
not yield a Nash equilibrium with social cost r + 1, then there is
none.
Lemma 4. There is a value of p ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1} for which fp(r+
1, 0, r, 0, k) = 1 or fm(r + 1, 0, k) = 1, if and only if there is a Nash
equilibrium A with sc(A) = r + 1.
Proof. We establish by induction on i that fp(a, b, c, d, i) = 1 if and
only if there is a way to allocate the items of the first i colors into
the two sets of bins such that the first p bins have a or a+ 1 colors
and exactly b of them have a+1 colors and the second group of bins
has c or c+1 colors and exactly d bins have c+1 colors. This claim
is sufficient by Lemma 2.
The claim for i = 0 is trivial, since there are no such items and
thus the only feasible values for a, b, c, d are all zeros.
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Assume that the claim holds for i, and analyze the cases leading
to fp(a, b, c, d, i + 1) = 1. Assume that this value is set to 1 due to
a value of ti+1 using (1) or (2). Then, our solution packs the items
of color i+ 1 into exactly ti+1 bins of the first set. By Lemma 3, we
first use the b bins with a + 1 colors, and if necessary, use also the
other bins of the first set of bins. Otherwise, we set this value to 1
due to some value of ti+1 using (3) or (4). Then we pack the items of
color i+1 into exactly ti+1 bins of the second set of bins. Again, we
use first the d bins which have c+ 1 colors, and if necessary, we use
also some of the other bins of the second set of bins. Note that by
our conditions on ti+1, there are sufficient bins of the corresponding
set of bins, and enough items of color i + 1 so that we can actually
spread its items into ti+1 distinct bins. The claim now follows by the
induction assumption.
To prove the other direction, assume that there is a way to allo-
cate the items of the first i+ 1 colors into the two sets of bins such
that the first p bins have a or a+1 colors and exactly b of them have
a+ 1 colors and the bins of the second group have c or c+ 1 colors
and exactly d bins have c + 1 colors. Denote by ti+1 the number of
bins used to pack the items of color i + 1, and use this value in the
recursion formula for setting the value of fp(a, b, c, d, i + 1). Then,
this value is 1 due to the line corresponding to the set of bins for
which this partition of the items allocates the items of color i + 1,
using the value of ti+1. ⊓⊔
Therefore, we have established the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Algorithm SolveWNE computes a worst Nash equilib-
rium in time polynomial in the number of items.
4 Strong Equilibria in Bin Coloring Games
Recall the proof of Lemma 1. The optimal assignment constructed
in this proof is also strong. This establishes that every uncapacitated
bin coloring game admits a strong equilibrium and that one strong
equilibrium can be calculated in time O(k). Additionally, the strong
price of stability SPoS(BC) is 1.
The analysis of the strong price of anarchy follows:
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Theorem 3. The strong price of anarchy SPoA(BC) is asymptoti-
cally 1.
Proof. Given a strong Nash equilibrium define an undirected graph
G = (V,E) where V = {1, 2, . . . ,m} corresponds to the set of bins
and there is an edge e = (u, v) between two vertices u and v (assume
that v > u) if there is a color such that at least one item with this
color is packed into u and one such item is packed into v and if none
of the bins u + 1, u + 2, . . . , v − 1 contains an item of this color.
We associate the edge with the inducing color. Note that the edges
associated with a color, are the edges of a simple path in G.
If there is an edge e = (u, v) in G then the number of colors in u
and v has to be equal, as otherwise the items of the color present in
both bins want to change to the bin with fewer colors. The two bins
u and v can also have only one color in common, as otherwise the
items of the common colors can form a coalition and improve their
situation by sorting the colors to the two bins.
Additionally, the graph G does not contain a cycle. The cycles
with edges of a single color were removed in the construction and
cycles with edges of at least two colors contradict the strong equilib-
rium property: Such a cycle allows the coalition of the items inducing
the edges of the cycle to improve their situation by directing the cy-
cle and shifting all items of a common color along the corresponding
directed edge and thus decreasing the number of colors in each bin
of the cycle by one.
Thus the graphG is a forest, in which every connected component
has a common number of colors. These numbers of colors may differ
by at most one, as otherwise the assignment of items to bins would
not even be a Nash equilibrium.
Hence, keeping in mind that there are k colors and every edge in
the graph corresponds to a color being used not in one but in two
bins, we can conclude, that in the worst case G is a tree and the
maximal number of different colors in a bin is bounded by
⌈
k +m− 1
m
⌉
≤
⌈
k
m
⌉
+ 1
Using Lemma 1 this yields the desired result. ⊓⊔
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The bound established in the proof of Theorem 3 is tight, as the
following example shows:
Consider m bins, three colors {red, blue, green} and one red, one
blue and m− 1 green items. Obviously packing only three bins, one
for each color is optimal. But assigning the red and the blue item
to the first bin and one green item to any other bin is also a strong
equilibrium, as the green items cannot improve their situation and
thus are not willing to participate in a coalition.
Theorem 4. Every capacitated bin coloring game Γ =[m, k, (ni)i∈{1,...,k},
U < ∞] admits an optimal strong equilibrium, i.e., PoS(BCcap) =
SPoS(BCcap) = 1.
Proof. Let Γ =[m, k, (ni)i∈{1,...,k}, U ] be an instance of the capac-
itated bin coloring game and σ∗4 an optimal strategy profile which
is additionally lexicographically optimal in the following sense: The
i-th component of this lexicographic (auxiliary) objective function
is to minimize the number of items which are packed in bins with
exactly sc(σ∗) − i + 1 colors. We next argue that σ∗ is a strong
equilibrium.
Assume for the sake of a contradiction that there is a coali-
tion I ⊆ N which has an incentive to deviate from σ∗ to σ¯I . Let
p be the maximal cost of an item in I in strategy profile σ∗:
p = max
i∈I
ci(σ
∗) = max
i∈I
clσ∗
i
(σ∗).
For every q ≥ p, no member of coalition I is packed in a bin with q
colors in (σ∗−I , σ¯I), as otherwise it has no benefit from participating
in the coalition. Hence, for every bin j with clj(σ
∗) = q ≥ p+ 1, the
color load stays the same after the deviation, i.e., clj(σ
∗
−I , σ¯I) = q.
Thus, for every such bin j, the items assigned to it in σ∗ and (σ∗−I , σ¯I)
are identical.
However, there is an item i ∈ I with
clσi(σ
∗) = p = ci(σ
∗) > ci(σ
∗
−I , σ¯I).
Hence, the number of items which are packed in bins with color load
at least p strictly decreased by the deviation of coalition I. Hence,
4 We use the notation of a strategy profile instead of an assignment because this eases
notation concerning possible coalitions.
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the new solution is lexicographic smaller than σ∗ and this contradicts
the lexicographic optimality of σ∗. ⊓⊔
The proof of Theorem 4 does not imply a polynomial time algo-
rithm to find a strong equilibrium. Having such a non-constructive
proof is justified by the the fact that finding an optimal assignment
to the capacitated case is NP-hard by results of Krumke et al. [20].
The proof of Theorem 4 is a generic proof implying also that
there is an optimal strong equilibrium if the bins of the game have
different capacities or the game is asymmetric either in the way that
the strategy sets of each item is restricted to several bins, or if some
colors imply conflicts and cannot be packed together in one bin.
Theorem 5. The strong price of anarchy SPoA(BCcap) of capaci-
tated bin coloring games is unbounded but equals to the number of
bins if only games with a fixed number of bins are considered.
Proof. Consider bin coloring games BCcap,m with a fixed number m
of bins. The upper bound follows from Lemma 1. Hence, it suffices
to prove the lower bound of m on the SPoA(BCcap,m). Consider the
following instance where t is a large integer number to be specified
later. We let U = mt, there is one color, say color 1, with m(m− 1)t
items, and additional set of mt items each of which has a distinct
color. The social optimal solution packs in each bin t items of the
additional set of items together with U − t = (m− 1)t items of the
first color. We next describe a strong equilibrium. In this solution
the items of the first color are packed into the first m− 1 bins. Each
such bin is allocated mt such items and hence no further items can
be packed into these bins. The additionalmt items of the other colors
are packed into the remaining bin. This solution has a cost of mt.
It is clearly a strong equilibrium because the items of the first color
have no incentive to deviate, and the other items cannot deviate due
to the capacity constraint. Hence, we conclude that the strong price
of anarchy of the capacitated bin coloring games is at least mt
t+1
and
this ratio tends to m as t grows to infinity. ⊓⊔
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5 Weakly/Strictly Pareto optimal Nash
Equilibria in Bin Coloring Games
In the uncapacitated case, the optimal assignment give in the proof
of Lemma 1 is also weakly and strictly Pareto optimal. For the ca-
pacitated case the lexicographically optimal assignment used in the
proof of Theorem 4 is also strictly and weakly Pareto optimal.
This established not only existence of strictly and weakly Pareto
optimal Nash equilibria in capacitated as well as uncapacitated bin
coloring games but additionally the following prices of stability:
wPPoS(BC) = sPPoS(BC) = wPPoS(BCcap) = sPPoS(BCcap) = 1
For weakly Pareto optimal Nash equilibria, the lower bound on
the price of anarchy established in Theorem 3 applies, as wPNE(Γ ) ⊆
SE(Γ ) for every game Γ .
But for strictly Pareto optimal Nash equilibria the situation is
different:
Theorem 6. The strictly Pareto price of anarchy sPPoA(BC) of un-
capacitated bin coloring games is 1. Moreover, social cost of every
weakly Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium exceeds the optimal social
cost by at most 1.
Proof. Let Γ be an instance of the uncapacitated bin coloring game.
Assume there is a strictly (respectively, weakly) Pareto optimal Nash
equilibrium σ of Γ with sc(σ) ≥ opt(Γ ) + 1 (sc(σ) ≥ opt(Γ ) + 2).
We know that in a Nash equilibrium the color load of two bins can
differ by at most 1. Hence, the color load of the bins in σ is at least
opt(Γ ) (opt(Γ ) + 1). Thus, jointly deviating to an optimal solution
does not worsen (strictly improve) the situation for any item in the
game. But those items assigned to the bin which determines the
social cost of σ, are better off after the deviation. This contradicts
the assumption of σ being strictly (weakly) Pareto optimal. ⊓⊔
To address the capacitated case, first look at games with a fixed
number of bins m. The tight bound of m for the price of anarchy
of capacitated bin coloring games with m bins can be transfered to
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weakly as well as strictly Pareto optimal Nash equilibria by using
the upper bound for Nash equilibria given in Theorem 1 and the
lower bound established for strong equilibria in Theorem 5. Thus,
wPPoA(BCcap,m) and sPPoA(BCcap,m) equal m, and wPPoA(BCcap)
and sPPoA(BCcap) are unbounded.
6 Conclusion and Further Research
The newly introduced bin coloring games admit optimal solutions
that are Nash, strong as well as strictly and weakly Pareto optimal
equilibria in the capacitated and the uncapacitated setting. Besides
establishing existence, this determines the prices of stability for all
four equilibrium concepts to be 1.
In the uncapacitated case an optimal strong equilibrium can be
found in polynomial time. Additionally, a worst Nash equilibrium
can be found in time polynomial in the number of items. The price
of anarchy is unbounded, the strong price of anarchy as well as the
weakly Pareto price of anarchy are asymptotically 1 and the strictly
Pareto price of anarchy is exactly 1.
In contrast to that, in the capacitated case the strong price of
anarchy as well as the Pareto prices of anarchy are unbounded and
equal the number of bins if only games with a fixed number of bins
are considered.
An overview of the results concerning the prices of anarchy and
stability is given in Table 1.
Finding an optimal solution in the capacitated case is NP-hard
due to results of Krumke et al. [20] and our proof of existence of
an optimal strong equilibrium resembles this fact. The latter proof
of existence is generic in the way that it also applies if the bins
have different capacities or other additional restrictions are given.
Moreover, the proofs of the upper bounds on the price of anarchy
and price of stability does not change for all notions of equilibria
studied in this paper, if we consider the model in which the capacity
of a bin may be non-identical among all bins. Thus directions of
further research are to analyze these variants of the model.
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BC BCcap
PoS PoA PoS PoA
Nash equilibria 1 ∞ 1 ∞
strong equilibria 1 asymp. 1 1 ∞
weakly Pareto optimal Nash
equilibria
1 asymp. 1 1 ∞
strictly Pareto optimal Nash
equilibria
1 1 1 ∞
Table 1: Overview of results
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